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ABSTRACT 
This thesis investigates the conditions under which a society endorses or is compliant 
with extremist ideology.  Using social movement theory and literature on drivers of 
violent extremism, the thesis focuses specifically on the potential for religious extremism 
in Nigeria. Nigeria is particularly important because it is the most populated country in 
sub-Saharan Africa and it is where both Christianity and Islam, the world’s two largest 
religions, converge.   Nigeria also illustrates one of the clearest examples of religion 
being used politically and the potential for extremism that this presents. Examining 
Nigeria will test the specific conditions that make a state vulnerable to extremist ideology 
and offer insights into reducing the expansion of extremist religious groups within similar 
societies. 
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In 1993, Samuel Huntington argued that in the post Cold War world, international 
relations would be driven by a “clash of civilizations,” where civilizations are defined by 
religious differences.  Many societies have devolved from moderate and secular belief 
systems to extremist, religious ideologies, seeming to support Huntington’s hypothesis.  
Religious extremism and radicalism are equated with a deep-felt desire for fundamental 
changes to government and/or society.  Such a desire for far-reaching reforms can be a 
constructive catalyst for development and progress in any society, such as the land 
reforms in India and democratic transitions in Eastern Europe.  However, violent 
extremism and radicalism is the catalyst for change in a society driven by ideologies that 
promote intolerance, hatred, and violence.1 The factors that determine why people resort 
to religious extremism vary from one nation to another. Nowadays, the desire to return to 
a stricter or fundamental application of religion seems to be prevalent. In this case, those 
who resort to extremism argue that their religion is being corrupted either by secular 
governments or corrupt religious leaders. In any case, in order to reverse such a dramatic 
trend, one should first understand the existing social and political dynamics. The solution 
applicable to one nation is not necessarily the same as it is to another. 
This thesis looks specifically at the rise of extremism in Nigeria. As a key player 
in the Muslim world, Nigeria, with an estimated 150 million people, is approximately 
half Muslim and half Christian.  Since the nineteenth century, the Sokoto caliphate, the 
institution that remains the backbone of Nigerian Islam today, has dominated the northern 
regions of Nigeria.2  After the Sokoto Jihad of the late eighteenth century, the Sokoto 
Caliphate was established as a social and political power to challenge the existing 
political orders and often succeeded in overthrowing or significantly transforming 
                                                 
 1 “Countering Radicalization Through Development Assistance – A Country Assessment Tool.” 
(Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 2007), 7. 
 2 Stephanie Schwartz, “Is Nigeria a Hotbed of Extremism?” United States Institute of Peace 
Peacebrief  27 (2010): 3. 
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existing political systems.  The Sokoto Caliphate is distinct among the other political 
communities in Nigeria because its only requirement for full citizenship is to be Muslim, 
without any regard for heritage tribe, or race.3  Although the majority of West African 
Islam has been influenced by Sufism, the Sokoto Caliphate has maintained a decidedly 
West African version of Islam, less dependent on outside influences in the Arab World.  
However, there has been a revival of the Sufi brotherhoods in Nigeria in the twentieth 
century in part due to links in Senegal.4  With Nigeria’s vast division in ethnicity and 
religion, Nigeria has experienced years of violence linked to coups, state repression, and 
intra-ethnic and religious clashes.5 
Nigeria continues to experience exponential growth in the number, size, and 
socio-political importance of religious movements within its Christian and Islamic 
societies.6  The northern Nigerian states have become more fundamentalist Islamic with 
the reintroduction of Sharia law in 1999–2000, codified within the state constitutional 
law of 12 of Nigeria’s 36 states.7   
Additionally, Christianity and Islam continue to merge and clash within the 
Middle Belt of Nigeria, where the largest numbers of minority ethnic groups reside,  most 
of whom are Christians and members of traditional African religions, with few Muslim 
converts.  The Middle Belt of Nigeria lacks physical borders but designates the 
longitudinal, geographic region of central Nigeria, populated largely by minority ethnic 
groups, and constitutes the ethno-linguistic barrier in the country, drawing a separation 
between the principally Islamic North and the more secular Christian South.  Since the 
religious and social division in the North and the South, the North has developed—
                                                 
3 Yusufu Bala Usman, “The Sokoto Caliphate and Nation-Building” (Text of a Speech at the Opening 
Ceremony of the International Conference on the Sokoto Caliphate and its Legacies, Abuja, Nigeria, 
Monday, June 14, 2004).  
 4 Schwartz, “Is Nigeria a Hotbed of Extremism?” 3.  
 5. Siri Aas Rustad, “Power-sharing Agreements, Negotiations and Peace Processes:  Power-sharing, 
negotiations and Peace Processes,” (Oslo: Center for the Study of Civil War International Peace Research 
Institute, 2008), 8. 
6 Jonathan C. H. Hill, “Sufism in Northern Nigeria: Force for Counter-Radicalization?” (Carlyle: 
Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2010), 2–3.  
 7 Schwartz, “Is Nigeria a Hotbed of Extremism?” 3. 
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socially and politically—at a slower pace than the South.  The South has experienced 
greater development and modernization in education, per capita income, urbanization, 
commerce and industrialization.  “This uneven development has existed in Nigeria since 
its independence in 1960.”8 
Nigeria’s post-independence era has been marked by constant instability. In the 
First and Second Republic, ethnic and religious tensions existed with each region trying 
to control political power.  These tensions continued in the Third and Fourth Republics 
with a growing trend towards religiously motivated violence. 
Most recently, in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic, the country has experienced a 
remarkable increase in the amount of religiously related violence.  In 1999, 
fundamentalist Muslims struck in Kwaya state, destroying more than 14 churches.  In 
February 2000, riots broke in Kaduna and Abia over Sharia law.  With the rise of 
fundamentalist Muslims, violence has also extended to Oyo and Osun.  Particularly in 
Osun, riots were caused by Alfa Mofoye, an Islamic preacher who is said to have taken 
the town of Saki by surprise with his fiery brand of Islam.  The preacher resorted to using 
unprintable words to describe Jesus Christ and engaged in acts that infuriated Christian 
groups in the town.  Then, in May 2000, religious conflict renewed in Kaduna, resulting 
in 300 lives lost in less than 24 hours. In November, fanatic Muslims destroyed the 
ancient Moreni shrine in Offa Kwara state, resulting in several wounded.  The year 2000 
was one of the most violent years in Nigeria, and religious violence has continued almost 
every year since then. The increasing number of casualties in various places has made the 
Fourth Republic one of the bloodiest in years.9 
To investigate the rise of extremism in Nigeria, this thesis utilizes two theories—
Social Movement Theory and Drivers of Violent Extremism—to fully measure the 
specific dynamics of political and social tensions in Nigeria and the process in which a 
society and its social organizations are vulnerable to religious extremist ideology, and the 
passive acceptance of religious extremist organizations. Social movement theory will 
                                                 
8 Rustad, Power-Sharing and Conflict in Nigeria: Centre for the Study of Civil War, 2008.  
9 Schwartz, Is Nigeria a Hotbed of Islamic Extremism? 3.  
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help determine the grievances raised by each discriminatory group and society within 
Nigeria, and the mobilizing structures and political opportunities used to engage in 
violence.  The Drivers of Violent Extremism will identify the vulnerable groups within 
Nigeria and the shared dedication to a particular vision or ideology that collectively 
brings violent extremists together to change how society ought to be organized, as well as 
a strong questioning of the foundation upon which their society is presently organized.10  
Furthermore, Drivers of Violent Extremism will identify the motivational factors and 
triggers inducing each antagonist group to engage in religious violence.  
The analysis of Nigeria will determine the underlying causes that induced the 
growing trend towards religious-motivated conflict in Nigeria.  Furthermore, 
understanding the case of Nigeria and its findings will test the hypotheses formulating the 
specific circumstances and conditions that make individuals vulnerable to religious 
extremism, and determine the conditions under which a society will endorse or comply 
with religious extremist ideology or society’s inability to defend itself from the coercion 
of religious extremism. 
This thesis will explore the grievances, motivation, and triggers of violent 
extremism in Nigeria, paying particular attention to the role of religion in Nigerian 
politics.  First, the thesis will introduce the historical context of Nigeria and the 
introduction of Islam and Christianity in the country, and also its relations with Europe 
during the colonial era and afterwards. The chapter will also examine the role that 
religion played in the political arena of Nigeria in each of the four Republics.   
Then this thesis will utilize two theories, Social Movement Theory and Drivers of 
Violent Extremism, to fully measure the specific dynamics of political and social tensions 
in Nigeria and the process in which a society and its social organizations are vulnerable 
to religious extremist ideology.  In the analysis, variables drawn from the theories will be 
used to understand extremism in Nigeria. The concluding chapter will summarize the 
findings and look at the potential for a rise or decline of extremism in Nigeria. 
                                                 
10 Guilian Denoeux and Lynn Carter, “USAID Guide to the Drivers of Violent Extremism,” 
(Washington: USAID, 2009), 12.  
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II. CONTEXT 
To understand tensions in Nigeria and their potential for Islamic extremism, it is 
necessary to understand the historical, cultural, and political dynamics in the one of the 
largest and the most populous countries in sub-Saharan Africa. This chapter outlines the 
historical, social, and economic environment of this country, paying particular attention 
to the history of ethno-religious tensions in Nigeria. 
A. HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
Prior to the British introduction of Christianity, Nigeria had experienced over 500 
years of Islam.11 In general, Islam in West Africa followed the ancient trading routes that 
linked Egypt to the West African empire of Ghana, which flourished from the eighth 
century onwards.12 Muslim traders and scholars thus became the early transmitters of 
Islamic culture and faith to the region.13  
Alongside the spread of Islam, another major dynamic that emerged in the region 
was the kingdom of Songhay, which in the fifteenth century was ruled by Sonni Ali.14 
After the death of Sonni Ali, the empire was ruled by Askiyya Muhammad who extended 
his rule through a jihad to the Hausa region (today northern Nigeria).15  Islam further 
spread in Nigeria through trading routes by land and water.  The regions of Kanem and 
Bornu had been in contact with Muslims in North Africa since the ninth century.16 Major 
conversions of the population occurred gradually over the next 400 years.  Muslim 
dynasties were established in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and Sufi communities 
were well known in the region during that time. The most important Sufi communities 
                                                 
11 Azim A. Nanji, "Islam in West Africa," in The Muslim Almanac (Gale Research Inc.), 47.  
12 Niels Kastfelt, Religion and Politics in Nigeria: A Study in the Middle Belt Christianity. 
13 Nanji, "Islam in West Africa," in The Muslim Almanac (Gale Research Inc.). 
14 Kastfelt, Religion and Politics in Nigeria: A Study in the Middle Belt Christianity. 
15 Nanji, "Islam in West Africa," in The Muslim Almanac (Gale Research Inc.). 
16 Kastfelt, Religion and Politics in Nigeria: A Study in the Middle Belt Christianity. 
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established in West Africa were the Qadiriyya and the Tijaniyya who, to this day, remain 
the largest Sufi communities in the region.17 The trade in gold also caused migration and 
contacts with Muslims from parts of Hausaland to present-day Nigeria, and the Hausa 
language and culture became an important medium for the expression of Muslim culture 
and learning in the region.18 Eventually, the combination of Islam and language made 
Hausa the lingua franca of a very large population in West Africa.  
In addition to being influenced by the spread of Islam, the Nigerian political 
environment has also been strongly affected by its long-term relations with Europe. The 
first contacts between Nigeria and Europeans occurred in the fifteenth century with the 
Portuguese trading along the coast of Africa. Following this initial contact, many African 
countries, including Nigeria, provided the labor force for plantations in the Caribbean and 
the Americas. The slave trade became all the more intense as the demand for labor on 
various plantations increased; Africans thus became an alternative source of labor.19 In 
the eighteenth century, with the rise and domination of the British Empire, Nigeria 
became a British colony. This period lasted more than a century, from 1850 until 1960. 
British colonial rule was marked essentially by three phases: the capture of the colony, 
the taming of the colony and the aftermath of colonialism and the independence era.20 
The formation of Nigeria as a colony was not easy for the British.  The 
population’s reaction to the occupation was mixed. Some Nigerians actively collaborated 
and helped the British, while others were passive and defiant. Another fringe of the 
population resisted the cultural and political invasion of the British and military power 




                                                 
17 Kastfelt, Religion and Politics in Nigeria. 
18 Kastfelt, Religion and Politics in Nigeria: A Study in the Middle Belt Christianity. 
19 John Hatch, Nigeria: The Seeds of Disaster, ed. Henry Regnery Company, 1970), 98. 
20 Nnamdi Ihuegbu, Colonialism and Independence: Nigeria as a Case Study [2002]), 
http://www.southernct.edu/organizations/hcr/2002/nonfiction/colonialism.htm (accessed February 2011), 1. 
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ethnic groups, particularly when they tried to conquer the Yoruba in the west and Muslim 
Hausa in the north.21  Other confrontations arose in the Igbo states of the Delta region 
with their rich natural resources.22  
The British used education as a tool to further dominate the Nigerian people and 
shape their ways of thinking. Specifically, the British used Christian missionary schools 
to not only educate the population, but convert it to Christianity.23 During the nineteenth 
century, the Church Missionary Society and the Methodist Missionary Society were the 
first British organizations to set up schools in Nigeria. Their work was mostly conducted 
in the southern half of Nigeria, which was safer than the Muslim North. Some of their 
achievements included the translation of the Bible into local languages, such as Yoruba 
and Ibo, the introduction of vocational education, the use of English as the vernacular, 
and the establishment of a proper code of conduct for the people.24 Civilization for the 
British meant making Nigeria into what they called “Christian Black Europe,” by 
isolating them from the evil influences of their pagan past and present.25 A good citizen 
in Nigeria was equated to one who was African in blood, Christian by religion, and 
British in culture and intellect.26 The introduction of Christianity in Muslim areas also led 
to religion-based skirmishes between the local Muslims and the British Christians. An 
example of these tensions was the formation of a number of Muslim radical movements, 
such as the Mahdists, whose goal was to cleanse the land of the British.27 
Contrary to popular belief, in the early years of Nigerian independence in the 
1960s, the country was still under British control. British colonialism made Nigeria and 
other colonies join diverse superficial political entities, such as the Commonwealth, 
                                                 
21 Niels Kastfelt, Religion and Politics in Nigeria: A Study in the Middle Belt Christianity. 
22 Nnamdi Ihuegbu, Colonialism and Independence: Nigeria as a Case Study [2002]), 
http://www.southernct.edu/organizations/hcr/2002/nonfiction/colonialism.htm (accessed February 2011), 1. 
23 Kastfelt, Religion and Politics in Nigeria: A Study in the Middle Belt Christianity. 
24 Ihuegbu, Colonialism and Independence: Nigeria as a Case Study, 1. 
25 Kastfelt, Religion and Politics in Nigeria: A Study in the Middle Belt Christianity. 
26 Ihuegbu, Colonialism and Independence: Nigeria as a Case Study, 1. 
27 Kastfelt, Religion and Politics in Nigeria: A Study in the Middle Belt Christianity. 
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which inherently kept them under the British monarchy. In this period, many problems 
emerged from the newly independent country concerning the struggle amongst the 
different ethnic groups to share the nation’s wealth.  
Creating a national identity in the newly independent country was a challenge as 
increasing political participation and representation reinforced the sub-identities of 
different groups.28 The various ethnic groups, in other words, could not always surmount 
their separate group identities in favor of a national interest. The failure, in the early 
years, of Nigeria‘s democracy to survive its ethnic conflicts, resulted in endless coup 
d’états and decades of military rule. In February 2000, Nigeria elected President 
Olusegun Obasanjo as the first democratically elected president in more than two 
decades.29 Nigeria is now a federation of thirty-six states with its capital as Abuja, and is 
currently living under the Fourth Republic, which means the fourth draft of the 
constitution since its independence. In April 2011, Nigeria had its third presidential 
elections in the Fourth Republic. The incumbent president, Johnathan Godluck, a 
Christian from the Niger Delta, was declared the winner. After the announcement of 
election results, violence broke out, particularly in the northern states where his main 
contender Muhammad Buhari, originates. Police reported a bomb detonation in a hotel in 
northern Nigeria, wounding eight people. Other incidents were also reported in the North, 
including officials’ houses burned, and riots.30 
B. POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS CONTEXT 
Nigeria has the second largest population in Africa, after Egypt, and the largest 
population in sub-Saharan Africa, with 138 million inhabitants.31 Tied with Turkey and 
Iran, Nigeria is the sixth largest Muslim country in the world.32 The population is 
                                                 
28 Kastfelt, Religion and Politics in Nigeria: A Study in the Middle Belt Christianity. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Voice of America News, 2011, http://www.voanews.com/english/news/africa/North-South-Divide-
in-Nigerias-Presidential-Election--120001084.html. 
31 John N. Paden, "Muslim Civic Cultures Conflict Resolution: The Challenge of Democratic 
Federalism in Nigeria," in The Brookings Institution, 2005). 
32 Ibid. 
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composed of more than 250 ethnic groups of which the following are the most populous 
and politically influential: Hausa and Fulani 29 percent (North), Yoruba 21 percent 
(West), Igbo (Ibo) 18 percent (South), Ijaw 10 percent, Kanuri 4 percent, Ibibio 3.5 
percent, Tiv 2.5 percent.33 Half of the population is Muslim and the other half is 
Christian or animist. Trust among the ethnically diverse population is sometimes shaky. 
Competition for jobs, education, and other resources also feed the ethnic rivalry. 
After the British conquered the region, they set up native authorities throughout 
Nigeria, under the policy of indirect rule, utilizing preexisting political units for 
administrative purposes. Initially, the British ruled northern and southern Nigeria as 
separate colonies.34 In the north, the British identified three distinct political and cultural 
entities: the Sokoto Empire, which is sometimes referred as the Fulani Empire, the Borno 
Empire or Kanuri Empire, and the minorities of the middle belt.35 The Muslim north 
region had been dominated by the Sokoto caliphate since the nineteenth century.  The 
Sokoto Caliphate was established in 1804, following a jihad led by Shehu Dan Fodio and 
was the largest single Muslim political entity in nineteenth century sub-Saharan Africa.36 
The Sokoto Caliphate remains the backbone of Nigerian Islam to this day.  
However, the balance of power between the Borno-dominated areas in the 
northeast and the Sokoto Caliphate-dominated areas has been a constant challenge in 
Nigerian politics. While much of West African Islam has been influenced by Sufism, the 
mystical understanding of Islam, the Sokoto Caliphate has maintained a West African 
version of Islam, less dependent on outside influences in the Arab world.37 Nonetheless, 
in the twentieth century there has been a revival in Sufi brotherhoods in Nigeria in part 
                                                 
33 Rotimi T. Suberu, Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Nigeria, ed. United States Institute of Peace 
PressUnited States Institute of Peace Press, 2001), 247. 
34 Paden, Muslim Civic Cultures Conflict Resolution: The Challenge of Democratic Federalism in 
Nigeria. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Philip J. Shea, "Big Is Sometimes Best: The Sokoto Caliphate and Economic Advantages of Size in 
the Textile Industry African Economic History 34 (2006), 5, 
http://search.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/docview/227347451?accountid=12702. 
37 Schwartz, Is Nigeria a Hotbed of Islamic Extremism? (Whashington DC: United States Institute of 
Peace [May 4, 2010]). 
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due to links with Senegalese Sufis.38 Today, the most prevalent is the Tijaniyya 
brotherhood, which is also by far the largest Sufi brotherhood in Nigeria and probably in 
all of West Africa.39  
During the colonial period, the British had changed the systems of rule in Nigeria. 
This was strongest in the central and southern regions, where the systems of indirect rule 
placed certain Yoruba individuals as the leaders over others. This situation caused 
tensions and friction, especially among the Yoruba of western Nigeria; the political 
arrangement was a drastic change from the existing cultural and hierarchical structure of 
Nigerian culture.  Also, under the British system, many villagers were governed by 
people from other villages with whom they had been at odds, traditionally and 
historically.40  This system was unacceptable to the Yoruba people who felt that their 
views were not properly represented because they were under the direct rule of their 
ancestral enemies. Consequently, several Yoruba opposed the system and reacted 
violently against their intermediate rulers and colonial superiors.41 
In addition to the NSCIA, there are a number of “anti-establishment” Sunni 
networks gaining strength in Nigeria. While there is no public evidence of a “Taliban” 
movement, as we know it in Afghanistan, there is a Sunni movement known as the Boko 
Haram, whose leader died in police custody in July 2009, after he and his followers 
launched a campaign to challenge the police and the government.42  The Boko Haram is a 
Nigerian Islamic group seeking to impose Sharia Muslim law in the northern states of 
Nigeria. It purports that Western or non-Islamic education is “sin.” The group was 




                                                 
38 Schwartz, Is Nigeria a Hotbed of Islamic Extremism? 
39 Ibid., 2. 




moved to Kanamma, Yobe State, where it set up a base called “Afghanistan.” While the 
Boko Haram gained notoriety after its violent clashes with the police, it is a relatively 
small movement in Nigeria.43 
Religion has always been an inseparable component of Nigerian society. During 
the British colonial period, northern Nigeria was ruled by Muslim Sharia law. However, 
when Nigeria gained independence, criminal jurisdiction was transferred to the national 
level. In general, religion in Nigeria, whether Islam or Christian, is largely based on 
ethnic tradition or location. However, religious practices do differ even within the same 
ethnicity and location, particularly between elites and the grassroots masses. Some 
Nigerians believe that the north/south dichotomy threatens the existence of the nation. At 
the same time, many Nigerian leaders have worked hard to build bridges of 
understanding and to mediate conflicts between the country’s religious factions.  
C. ECONOMIC CONTEXT 
Nigeria is the number one oil producer in Africa and the world’s tenth largest 
crude oil producer; the country supplies 7 percent of U.S. oil. The GDP is estimated at 
$338.1 billion with an estimated real growth rate of 6.1 percent.44 In addition to oil 
production, Nigeria is an agricultural giant and the main crops are cocoa, peanuts, palm 
oil, corn, rice, and rubber. However, the main economic power of Nigeria comes 
essentially from its natural resources: petroleum, tin, iron ore, coal, limestone, lead, zinc, 
and natural gas. Major industries include crude oil, coal, tin, palm oil, peanuts, cotton, 
rubber, wood, textiles, cement and other construction materials, food products, chemicals, 
etc.45 
Despite sporadic attacks on oil installations, oil production has increased to more 
than 2 million barrels per day, shy of its earlier peak of 2.6 million.46 Natural gas outputs 
                                                 
43 Schwartz, Is Nigeria a Hotbed of Islamic Extremism.? 
44 The CIA World Factbook, "Nigeria."  




have also improved significantly. Economic growth is expected to be around 8 percent in 
2010, with the nonoil sector also performing very well. In the power industry, Nigeria 
currently generates the equivalent of one 40-watt light bulb for each of Nigeria’s 168 
million people.47 A power generation increase from 3,700 to 14,000 megawatts is 
expected to boost the economy by 2013.48 Foreign investor interest in the Nigerian 
banking and power sectors is also likely to boost the economy.  
Nigeria's economic power makes it one of the most powerful states in Africa, and 
the country aspires to the status of regional hegemony. Its creation and subsequent 
dominance of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is a key 
method by which the country seeks to forge closer sub-regional economic and military 
cooperation in order to further its long-standing strategic objective of expanding its 
markets and lessening French influence in West Africa. Nigeria also uses oil diplomacy 
as a means to achieve regional influence by selling oil to neighbors at concessionary 
rates.  
In addition to economic might, Nigeria has the largest army in sub-Saharan Africa 
(94,000-strong) and surpasses the combined total of its fourteen neighbors. However, 
domestic problems raise doubts about its ability to fulfill its leadership ambitions. The 
country’s global reputation has been negatively affected by domestic political instability 
and corruption.49 Within the context of Africa, Nigeria has provided leadership, along 
with South Africa, on a wide range of issues, from decolonization to regional 
peacekeeping, to both in the United Nations and African Union. Nigeria is often 
mentioned as a candidate for permanent membership on the UN Security Council.50  
Economic grievances have often been a subject of tension between the more 
educated and rich south, and the more populated northern regions. Because of their 
numerical advantage, northerners have maintained control over Nigerian politics for 
several years; however, their region has fewer natural resources than the south where 
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most the country’s wealth is derived.  These tensions reached their climax in 1967 with 
the civil war when the Igbo tried to secede from the rest of the federation. The secession 
was repressed and the federation was maintained. 
D. ETHNO-RELIGIOUS TENSIONS IN NIGERIA 
Religious violence in Nigeria must be understood as part of a complicated 
political context in a country striving to maintain national unity amongst an ethnically 
diverse population split evenly between Christians and Muslims. Nonetheless, various 
forms of ethno-religious tensions have existed throughout all four republics of Nigeria. 
Each republic was marked by the drafting of a new constitution in an attempt to engineer 
Nigerian political and cultural structures in a fashion that would keep Nigeria as one 
federal system.51 The political spectrum of Nigeria has also been marked by long years of 
military rule between each republic. Despite military suppression, ethno-religious 
violence increased throughout each period of military rule. 
1. The First Republic (1960–1966) 
Nigeria became independent on October 1, 1960. The period between this date 
and the first military coup d’état in January 1966 is usually referred as the First Republic. 
During this period, political tensions in Nigeria were mostly ethnic. After a plebiscite in 
February 1961, the northern Cameroons, which are a separate colonial entity, voted to 
join Nigeria. The country thus became a republic on  October 1, 1963 with a constitution 
that guaranteed a large measure of autonomy to three federal regions: North, East and 
West. Each of these regions corresponded to a major ethnic group: Hausa/Fulani, Igbo 
and Yoruba. This particular alignment of regions with ethnic populations almost 
guaranteed that political competition would form along ethnic lines in the First Republic.  
Nigeria adopted a parliamentary democracy, modeled along British lines, and 
emphasized majority rule. Unlike many other African countries that adopted a one-party 
system immediately after independence, Nigeria chose a regionally based multi-party 
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system. A sound constitution and multi-party system, however, were not enough to 
guarantee the survival of the newly formed state, and basic structural weaknesses 
remained. One of the most significant weaknesses was the disproportionate power of the 
Muslim North in the federation. The departing colonial authority had hoped that the 
development of national politics would prevent or obstruct any potential ethnic 
domination of power, underestimating the effects of a regionalized party system in a 
country where political power depended on the mobilization of ethnic groups.  
Around the late 1940s and early 1950s, major regional political parties emerged 
with the aim of controlling power in their own regions. The Northern People’s Congress 
(NPC) and the Action Group (AG), which controlled the Northern Region and the 
Western Region respectively, emerged this way. Also, the National Council of Nigerian 
Citizens (NCNC), which controlled the Eastern Region and the Midwestern Region, 
began as a national party but was forced by the pressure of regionalism to become 
primarily an Eastern party despite its strong support elsewhere in the federation. Each one 
of these regional parties was based upon, and derived their main support from, the major 
ethnic groups in their regions: NPC (Hausa/Fulani), AG (Yoruba), and NCNC (Igbo).  A 
remarkable and more ideologically-based political party that never achieved significant 
power was Aminu Kano’s radical Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU), which 
opposed the NPC in the north from its Kano base.52 
In the general election of 1959, the first in the immediate postcolonial period, the 
major parties won a majority of seats in their regions, but none emerged powerful enough 
to constitute a national government. A coalition was, therefore, necessary between the 
NPC and the NCNC. This coalition provided a north-south alliance that would not have 
been possible if the NCNC and the AG had formed a coalition. Later on, tensions started 
to spark within the coalition government. The senior partner began trying to increase 
power in favor of the northern region on the premise that the northern region had a 
political advantage derived from its preponderant size and population. The southern 
region on the other hand, had the economic advantage as most of the exported 
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agricultural products come from their region, in addition to their control of the federal 
bureaucracy. The NPC clearly sought to redress northern economic and bureaucratic 
disadvantages. The reactions to the fear of northern dominance, and especially the steps 
taken by the NCNC to counter the political dominance of the North, accelerated the 
collapse of the first republic.53  
By the time of the 1964 general elections, the country’s politics had polarized into 
competition between two opposing alliances: the Nigerian National Alliance made up of 
the NPC and the NNDC (i.e., a northern party), and the United Progressive Grand 
Alliance (UPGA) composed of the NCNC, the AG, and their allies (constituting a 
"southern" alignment). Each regional party openly intimidated its opponents in the 
campaigns. The Federal Electoral Commission could not guarantee neutrality and the 
army was called to supervise the elections. The UPGA resolved to boycott the elections, 
the Western Region became a theater of war between the NNDP (and the NPC) and the 
AG-UPGA. The rescheduled regional elections became violent. The federal government 
refused to declare a state of emergency and the military seized power on January 15, 
1966 in a coup that marked the collapse of the First Republic.54   
Another illustration of these struggles and violence happened in 1967 with the 
failed Biafra secession and the civil war from 1967–1970.  The Igbo people, an ethnic 
group fighting for equal socio-political participation under the leadership of Lt. Col. 
Odumegwu Ojuku, decided to secede from the rest of Nigeria and form a new country, 
the Biafra. The chain of events began with the 1966 coup led by General Aguyi Ironsi, an 
Igbo officer who toppled the government of Abubakar Tafewa Balewa, a northerner, 
killing about fifteen people. This revolution brought hope for socio-political equality to 
the oppressed Igbo.  But the celebration was short-lived as General Ironsi proved unable 
to manage the political situation produced by the coup. The failure of Ironsi led to the 
counter coup of July 1966, which was headed by Northerner Lt. Col Yakubu Gowon.   
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The Biafra secession was crushed along with all the hopes of the Igbo people; oppression 
and exclusion continued. The counter coup, also called the “Northern Revenge,” cost the 
lives of 214 people, mostly Igbo.  
2. The Second Republic (1979–1983) 
Ethnic and regional tensions remained present in the Second Republic despite the 
various efforts by both the political leaders and the clergy. Following the assassination of 
Nigerian Military Head of State, General Murtala Mohammed, in 1976, his successor, 
General Olusegun Obasanjo, initiated the transition process to terminate military ruling in 
1979. Obasanjo's military junta drafted a new constitution that mandated that political 
parties and cabinet positions reflect the “federal character” of the nation. Political parties 
were, therefore, required to be registered in at least two thirds of the states, and each state 
was required to produce at least one cabinet member. The widely monitored election of 
1979 saw the election of Alhadji Shehu Shagari on the NPN platform; on October 1, 
1979, he was sworn in as the President and Commander-in Chief of the Federal Republic 
of Nigeria.55  
However, the Second Republic’s administration was accused of being biased 
against minorities.56 As a result, political activism progressively raised voices criticizing 
the corruption of the government of Shehu Shagari.  
The Second Republic also witnessed a critical religious incident give rise to a new 
form of religious activism and violence that had not been seen before: the Maitatsine 
Incidents:   
An Islamic cult known as the Maitatsine, which started in the late 1970s and 
operated throughout the 1980s sparked riots in Kano, Kaduna, and Maiduguri after police 
tried to control its activities. The disturbances caused by this group in Kano alone 
resulted in the death of 4,177 in 1980. The second religious riots happened in 1982 at 
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Bulumkutu on the outskirts of Maiduguri, Borno State, and Kaduna. These riots were 
masterminded by Maitatsine’s lieutenants after his death. Their violence cost the lives of 
about 400 people and millions of dollars worth of property destroyed. The group was led 
by a mystical leader from Cameroon who claimed to have divine revelations superseding 
those of the prophet. The cult had its own mosques and preached a doctrine antagonistic 
to established Islamic and societal leadership; its message appealed primarily to marginal 
and poverty-stricken urban immigrants. These disaffected adherents ultimately lashed out 
at the more traditional mosques and congregations, resulting in violent outbreaks in 
several cities in the north. 
In order to appease religious tensions in the 1980s, Nigerian Muslims initiated an 
effort to bring all the disparate Islamic movements in Nigeria under one umbrella through 
the National Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs (NSCIA). This organization is now the 
leading Islamic organization for Nigeria. By tradition, the Sultan of Sokoto is the 
president of the NSCIA, the Shehu of Borno is the vice president, and a distinguished 
Yoruba legal scholar is the general-secretary.57 
The Shagari administration was ejected in a military coup led by General 
Muhammadu Buhari on New Year’s Eve 1983. The new military ruler cited charges of 
corruption and administrative incompetence as reasons for military intervention. 
President Shagari was placed under house arrest, and several members of his cabinet 
were either jailed or exiled. This coup marked the collapse of the second republic.58 Even 
though ethnic tension tended to disappear in the political system, the Maitatsine Crisis 
gave inspiration to a new form of social tension on religious lines that would also be 
recouped by politicians.   
3. The Third Republic (1993–1999) 
After another decade of military rule, the constitution of the Third Republic was 
drafted in 1989 when General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida, the military head of state, 
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promised to terminate military rule by 1990. Babangida lifted the ban on political activity 
in the spring of 1989, and his government established two political parties: the center-
right National Republican Convention (NRC) and the center-left Social Democratic Party 
(SDP). The goal of having only two political parties was to prevent them from forming 
along ethnic, regional or religious lines. State legislative elections were conducted in 
December 1991, while the presidential elections were postponed until June 1993. MKO 
Abiola, a wealthy Yoruba businessman, won a decisive victory in the presidential 
elections on the SPD platform. On June 23, 1993, Banaguida annulled the elections 
causing the country to fall into chaos. One of the main reasons why Babanguida annulled 
the election was the fact that Abiola, the newly elected president, was a Southern 
Christian. Had Abiola been either Northern or Muslim, the elections would have probably 
stood. Finally, IBB bowed to pressure from his inner circle and resigned from office on 
August 23, 1993. At this time, Ernest Shonekan, a Yoruba businessman and the head of 
IBB’s transition team, assumed the presidency as the head of the Interim National 
Government. Shonekan was unable to manage the political turmoil that ensued in the 
following months and his government was quietly removed from office by General Sani 
Abacha, then Minister of Defense, on November 17, 1993.59  
The Third Republic also witnessed an increase in  religious violence. On May, 5 
1993, there was a clash between two Muslim sects over the mosque built in the Tunda 
Waga area of the Brigade Quarters metropolis. Two people, including a police officer, 
were killed. In 1995, Gideon Akaluka, was murdered by Islamic militants while 
imprisoned for allegedly having used the Qur’an to clean himself after defecating.  
On September 18, 1996, thirty-five Sunni members protested the arbitrary 
detention of their leader, Mallam Ibrahim El-Zaky, and attacked a police station. On July 
25, 1997, the Sunnis in Kaduna state protested the refusal of the authorities to allow them 
to stage a demonstration in solidarity with their leader Ibrahim El Zaky-Zaky whose 1995 
arrest allegedly followed clashes between Shi'ite Moslems and Christians in the town of 
Kafanchan, south of Kaduna.  The police fired tear gas canisters to disperse the group 
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who was shouting Islamic slogans. Four people were killed in the demonstrations. On 
September 19, 1998, five people were killed following a clash between security men and 
a Muslim group, believed to be members of the Sunni branch of Islam, at the end of 
Jumat prayers at Fagge Jumat mosque in Kano. This was in retaliation for the group that 
organized an illegal protest demanding the release of their leader, Ibrahim El Zaky-Zaky. 
On December 13, 1998, irate Muslim fundamentalists vandalized several churches in the 
Maduguri metropolis, burning two vehicles over what they claimed to be the imposition 
of Christian religious studies in state schools. 
After the death of the Nigerian military ruler, General Sani Abacha, in 1998, his 
successor, General Abdusalami Abubakar, initiated a transition in order to return to 
democratic rule by 1999. Some of the measures to be taken included lifting the ban on 
political activities and the release of political prisoners from detention facilities. A new 
constitution was styled after the ill-fated Second Republic and the American presidential 
system. Political parties were formed (PDP, ANPP and AD) and elections were set for 
April 1999. These elections were widely monitored and saw the election of former 
military ruler, Olusegun Obasanjo, on the PDP platform. On May, 29, 1999, Obasanjo 
was sworn in as president and commander-in-chief of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. 
4. The Fourth Republic (1999–Present) 
The Fourth Republic marked the peak of religious–related violence. In 1999, 
fundamentalist Muslims struck in Kwaya State, destroying more than fourteen churches. 
The year 2000 marked another peak in religiously motivated violence, particularly 
between Muslims and Christians. In February, riots broke out in Kaduna over Sharia and 
many people were killed; more riots expanded to other states such as Abia State, but 
Kaduna State was the center of extreme violence and riots resulting in many more deaths. 
With the rise of fundamentalist Muslims, violence extended to Saki, Oyo State, and Iwo 
in Osun State. In this particular state, riots were caused by Alfa Mofoye, an Islamic 
preacher who is said to have taken the town of Saki by surprise with his fiery brand of 
Islam. The preacher resorted to using unprintable words to describe Jesus Christ and 
engaged in acts that infuriated Christian groups in the town. In May 2000, religious 
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conflict was renewed in Kaduna, resulting in 300 lives lost in less than twenty-four hours. 
In November, fanatic Muslims destroyed the ancient Moreni shrine in Offa Kwara State 
resulting in several wounded. If the year 2000 was one of the most violent years in 
Nigeria, the violence did not end there. Religious violence has continued almost every 
year since then, with increasing numbers of casualties in various places, thus making the 
Fourth Republic era the bloodiest in terms of religiously motivated violence. 
In the 1999–2000 elections, the twelve most northern states re-established Sharia 
criminal law, binding Muslims only. Each of the twelve states began to interpret Sharia 
criminal law in a slightly different way. In the central states, many feared that Sharia 
would be applied to Christians. This fear led to demonstrations in which Christian 
protestors took over the governor’s office, setting off a wave of killings and reprisals. 
Tensions between Christians and Muslims over the role of Sharia tend to split the country 
politically. However, in the 2007 elections, the issue was no longer as politically charged. 
Tensions over Sharia were tempered at the national level but other issues related to 
religion, such as balancing ethno-religious representation in political parties and 
establishing nonpreferentialism for religion in politics, remained a concern in local and 
national politics.60 
Since independence in 1960, there have been various efforts at both the national 
and the grassroots levels to promote interfaith dialogue and communications between 
Muslims and Christians with the aim of preventing an outbreak of violence and promote 
ethno-religious tolerance and federal cohesion.  On the national level, the leaders of 
NSCIA and the Christian umbrella group, Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), have 
stated their commitment to interfaith dialogue and some form of peace building between 
the two communities.  The government of Nigeria has also used a variety of mechanisms 
to manage religious conflict for the sake of national unity. For instance, in the 1990s, the 
government moved the federal capital from Lagos, in the southwest, to Abuja, a city with  
 
 
                                                 
60 Schwartz, Is Nigeria a Hotbed of Islamic Extremism? 3. 
 21
a symbolically neutral location in the center of the country, and hence much closer to the 
Muslim north. Abuja became home to both a national mosque and a Christian ecumenical 
center.61 
E. CONCLUSION 
Maintaining national unity in Nigeria has always been a particular challenge 
because of the religious and ethnic diversity of the country. If the first form of tensions 
were based on purely ethnic factors, over the years this violence has tended to shift to 
religious motivations. Understanding the drivers of Nigeria’s ethno-religious tensions can 
help predict how the current situation in Nigeria will evolve over time. 
Nigeria’s civilian presidencies have been profoundly affected by the centralized 
practices under military rule. Nonetheless, the state has managed to function by 
recognizing its regional and geo-cultural zones and allowing power to be shared across 
these areas. As a result, political alliances across regions and ethno-religious groups have 
become a necessary condition for national unity.62 This is why Nigeria relies on both 
traditional cultural and more modern mechanisms to resolve conflicts. Nigeria is a case of 
central models of conflict and broader issues, both in Africa and in U.S.-Muslim world 
relations.63 
Despite setbacks, including the numerous outbreaks of ethno-religious violence, 
Nigeria has not disintegrated. The various governments and authorities have somewhat 
succeeded in maintaining institutions that can promote democracy and national 
integration.64 Over the years, Nigerians have learned that peace and unity cannot be 
realized without the proper political representation of all ethnic groups as well as the fair 
and equitable distribution of its natural resources.65 Consequently, nation-building has 
largely centered on designing institutions that structurally embody these ideals. 
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III. SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY AND DRIVERS OF 
VIOLENT EXTREMISM  
The purpose of this chapter is to present two theoretical lenses for analyzing 
extremism:  the Social Movement Theory and Drivers of Violent Extremism.  Social 
Movement Theory (SMT) posits that the combination of political opportunity for 
collective action, informal or formal mobilizing structures and framing processes present 
in a society where grievances exist, induce change in an institutional structure or the 
informal power of a given national political system.66  SMT enables one to analyze 
whether Nigeria is vulnerable to Islamic extremism as the consequence of Nigerians 
taking direct action against the state of Nigeria over social and political injustices and 
inequalities.  However, those who lead and participate in social movements generally 
intend to create change through mass protests and political negotiations in order to create 
pressure on the government and compel it to confront the current injustice.67  
However, SMT alone does not explain the political unrest in Nigeria. Some 
groups, particularly Islamic extremist groups in Nigeria, seek to change the political and 
social status quo through acts of violence and terrorism.  In order to understand the 
motives and goals of these groups, Drivers of Violent Extremism will be used to explain 
why a society resorts to terrorism to foster change.  Together, both Social Movement 
Theory and Drivers of Violent Extremism provide the framework for analyzing Nigeria’s 
vulnerability to Islamic extremism.     
A. SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY (SMT) 
Scholars hypothesize that social movements occur when the following three 
factors exist: political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing processes. 
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Political opportunity considers the openness of a political environment to change.68  
Political opportunities are present when there is the possibility of “changes in the 
institutional structure or informal power relations of a given national political system.”69  
Additionally, such political opportunities “account for cross-national differences in the 
structure, extent, and success of comparable movements on the basis of differences in the 
political characteristics of the nation states in which they are embedded.” 70  Hence, 
social movements are shaped by broad political constraints and opportunities exclusive to 
each individual nation. 
Mobilizing structures are the collective organizations, informal and formal, 
through which people mobilize in a collective action. Political systems shape the 
prospects for collective action and its associated movements, thus the influence of 
political systems is not independent of the numerous mobilizing structures.  Two distinct 
theoretical perspectives of mobilizing structures exist:  resource mobilization and the 
political process model.71   
Resource mobilization theory focuses on the process of mobilization through 
formal organizations. It posits that social movements cannot occur without formal 
organizations to mobilize people.72  The second theory of mobilizing structures is the 
political process model, which credits existing social structures and their dynamics, like 
neighborhoods, community groups, occupational groups, and so on with facilitating 
collective action.  For example, local churches and college institutions and informal 
friendship networks led to significant bounds in the early stages of the American civil 
rights and women’s liberation movement. 73 
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Lastly, the framing process considers the ways in which grievances, and their 
solutions, are described and explained to affected groups. In addition to political 
opportunities and mobilizing structures, two perceptions must be present for the framing 
process to occur: grievances and optimism.  Grievances, in some aspect of the lives of the 
persons mobilized, and the hope that the situation can be changed must exist in order to 
encourage collective action.  McAdam et al. hypothesize that: “Lacking either one or 
both of these perceptions, it is highly unlikely that people will mobilize even when 
afforded the opportunity to do so.  Conditioning the presence or absence of these 
perceptions is that complex of social psychological dynamics, collective attribution and 
social construction, referred to as framing processes.”74 
When all three factors are present—political opportunity, mobilizing structures, 
and framing processes—the likelihood of a social movement increases.75  However, 
social movements possess another identity, a sacred-social phenomenon called religion.  
The worldviews, moral systems, theodicies, and organizations of religion legitimate and 
preserve social, political, and economic systems, and religion has the ability to challenge 
and overturn these systems as well.  Religion has the capacity to mobilize, promote, and 
abet social movements and the organized efforts of opposing groups within a society to 
promote or resist social change through disruptive means. When studying social 
movement theory, one cannot ignore religion because religion enables one to accurately 
identify and understand the cultural, expressive, ideological, emotional, and symbolic 
elements of collective action.76   
Religion is a cultural meaning-system, oriented toward the sacred or supernatural.  
Meaning-systems are the patterns of purpose and significance by which people make 
their lives meaningful.  The created meaning-systems are what societies commonly refer 
to as “culture,” a “social group’s conglomeration of shared codes, norms, values, beliefs, 
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and symbols that tell its members what to do with their lives and why.77  Culture gives 
life meaning.  It orients people to the world they inhabit, providing a sense of direction 
and purpose.” Sociologically, religion gives the people of social movements collective 
meaning and direction.78   
Since the late eighteenth century, Nigerian Islam has been used as a social and 
political power to challenge the existing political orders, and has succeeded in 
overthrowing or significantly transforming existing political systems.79  Furthermore, the 
northern Nigerian states have become more fundamentalist Islamic with the 
reintroduction of Sharia law in 1999–2000, codified within the state constitutional law of 
twelve of Nigeria’s thirty-six states.80  Therefore, using the framework of social 
movement theory—political opportunity, mobilizing structures, and framing processes—
in conjunction with religion, the influential, sacred-social phenomenon characteristic of 
social movement, enables one to examine whether the organizational conditions and 
framework and the Islamic motivations, collective meanings, and direction are present in 
Nigeria to induce an Islamic extremist social movement.       
B. DRIVERS OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM (DVE) 
Those who assess what factors drive people to take up violent extremism present 
another perspective in assessing when and why groups may mobilize under the banner of 
religion. Within this school, religious extremism is just one form of extremism; other 
forms include social, political, and ethnic extremism.   As understood here, religion is a 
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nature, and purpose of the universe.  Religion can have both a positive and a disruptive 
face. Sociologist Christian Smith states: “Religion can help to keep everything in its 
place.  But it can also turn the world upside-down.”81   
Explanations of why individuals resort to violent extremism frequently stress the 
“root causes,” “structural factors,” or “underlying conditions.”82  Social movement theory 
does not address the specific root causes or motivations and triggers that induce the 
collective groups to take action.  Drivers of violent extremism focus on three factors in 
particular—structural, motivational, and triggering factors—with the aim of identifying 
conditions leading to extremist mobilization.83  For example, when considering the rise 
of the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria in 1992, the structural factors that contributed to 
popular support included the strong state apparatus, lack of popular political 
participation, lack of basic human rights, and a weak civil society.  Lack of political 
opportunity created one motivational factor—the absence of political channels for 
expressing dissent.  Other motivational factors included the lack of social services 
provided and severe unemployment.  Last, it was the cancellation of elections in 1992, 
signifying even further lack of political opportunity that triggered the emergence of the 
Islamic Salvation Front.84 
Denoeux and Carter argue that root causes and underlying conditions for 
extremism—such as strongly held ideas, beliefs, identity, faith and deeply felt 
convictions to extremist movements—are manifest in three ways:  creating the 
inspiration, motivation, and mechanisms for joining and staying in such groups; 
providing moral justifications for resorting to violence; and facilitating organizational 
coherence and capacity.  However, they are quick to note that specific “underlying 
conditions” do not directly correlate with violent extremism. “Social and economic root 
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causes” in particular, do not automatically translate into extremism.85  Issues of poverty, 
unemployment, lack of public services, and economic stagnation do not appear to be the 
central preoccupation of many violent extremist organizations.  Instead, leaders and 
spokespersons for violent extremist movements are more concerned with issues of 
identity, existential threats, and cultural domination or oppression within society.86  
Additionally, extremist ideology allures specific segments of society.  Before measuring 
the susceptibility of a society to extremism, one must identify the vulnerable and the 
structural and motivational factors and triggers composing these vulnerable groups.87 
 
Figure 1.   Vulnerable Groups (From 88) 
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Structural factors are long-term risks that make some societies susceptible to 
radicalization, and describe pervasive conditions that become defining elements of 
society over time.  In regards to extremism and radicalization, structural factors are 
divided into negative factors that advance the development of extremism, and positive 
factors that hinder the advancement of extremism.  For example, within the same society, 
one may find a long-standing culture of violence that eases the acceptance of extremism 
along with a long-standing tradition of political tolerance and openness, which stalls the 
appeal of radical ideologies.  Often, the focus is on identifying the negative factors.  
However, one should not lose sight of the positive factors because they point to inherent 
local strengths that contribute to countering the emerging process of radical extremism.89 
Political factors refer to governance, political systems, representation, rule of law, 
power sharing, and conflict management.90  Denoux and Carter argue that political 
environments with the following factors are more prone to generate violent extremism:  
denial of basic political rights and civil liberties or political exclusion; highly repressive 
regimes that engage in gross violations of human rights; endemic corruption and 
impunity for well-connected elites; the presence of safe havens that are poorly governed, 
or ungoverned spaces; pre-existing, protracted and violent local conflicts that can be 
exploited by organizations seeking to advance their own agendas; state sponsorship of 
violent extremist groups; and discredited regimes with weak or nonexistent oppositions.91   
Weak democratic governance can also give rise to domestic terrorists groups.  
Therefore, consolidated, mature democracies and totalitarian states are less likely to  
experience domestic terrorism than semi-authoritarian states.92   Similarly, the absence of 
political reforms and of an establishment of participatory political inclusion and 
representation promote extremism.93   
                                                 
89. “Countering Radicalization Through Development Assistance – A Country Assessment Tool,” 11. 
90. Haider, “Drivers of Extremism,” 2.  
91. Denoeux and Carter, “USAID Guide to the Drivers of Violent Extremism,” 27.   
92. Haider, “Drivers of Extremism,” 3.  
93. “Report of the International Workshop On Global Terrorism, Terror, and Response Strategies” 
(Alexandria: SMWIPM Peace Studies Institute and Strategic Foresight Group, 2006), 17.  
 30
Furthermore, global political factors, such as the legacy of colonialism or 
occupation, may drive violent extremism as a counter to the threat of occupation.  For 
example, terrorist attacks influenced the withdrawal of the British Empire in Egypt and 
Palestine, and the withdrawal of France in Algeria.94  Similarly, many perceive the role 
of the United States in world affairs and global security, specifically regarding Iraq and 
Afghanistan, as neocolonialism. U.S. military occupation of both of these countries 
sparked insurgencies aimed at ousting its presence.     
Socio-economic factors are another potential driver of extremist activity, 
specifically, the welfare and livelihood of the people within the state, including 
employment opportunities and access to social services and education.95  Although these 
conditions may be powerful factors in explaining terrorism and insurgency, there are 
arguments that the reduction of poverty and rapid change in economic growth alone will 
not eradicate terrorism.  Regarding violence of a nonpolitical nature, economic 
inequalities are a critical explanatory factor.  Global studies of violent crime have found a 
significant correlation with socio-economic inequalities, but there is little or no 
correlation found with regard to political violence.  More findings support “a relationship 
between average per capita income across countries and civil conflict, than between 
income inequality within a country and civil conflict.  There is also evidence that many 
countries seem to tolerate increased inequality without greater exposure to violent 
conflict as long as there is economic growth.”  However, it is certain that large socio-
economic inequalities generate more conflict if economic growth prospects are negative, 
and if these inequalities are reinforced by political grievances like ethnic 
discrimination.96  
Security is another important condition that could facilitate the creation of 
extremist organizations.97  Specifically, states may offer extremists safe havens through 
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poorly governed spaces, areas of protracted local conflicts, and discredited regimes. All 
of these conditions are susceptible to exploitation by violent extremist organizations.  
Therefore, Denoeux and Carter argue that violent extremists are more drawn to weak 
states.98 
Finally, motivational and triggering factors are incidents—often volatile and 
diverse—that unleash the underlying pressure caused by existing structural factors.99  In 
other words, triggering factors are the sparks that ignite the fuel.  Religious rituals and 
public debate on culturally sensitive issues can be motivational factors driving violent 
extremism under certain structural conditions.100  Additionally, powerful ideologies and 
deeply felt convictions are the primary motivations behind numerous forms of violent 
extremism. Values and beliefs provide moral justifications for violence; the perceived 
presence of a compelling moral imperative is required for an individual to convince 
himself that it is acceptable and necessary to resort to any means necessary.  Self-interest, 
narrow grievances, the search for power or wealth, or the desire to advance particular 
political agendas motivate many violent extremists. But what brings violent extremists 
together is their shared dedication to a particular vision of how society ought to be 
organized and their strong questioning of the foundation upon which their society is 
presently organized.101  Additional motivational factors that drive violent extremism are 
recent social and political developments, the state’s ability to secure its sovereignty and 
citizens, and new influences of culture and religion amongst the state’s citizens.102 
C. ALIGNING SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY WITH DRIVERS OF 
VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN NIGERIA 
In past case studies, lasting successful political and social changes were due to 
social movements where the primary source of emergence was religion.  “From the black 
civil rights movement to Poland’s Solidarity movement, from the Nicaraguan revolution 
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of 1979 to the South African anti-apartheid movement, from Gandhi’s movement for 
Indian independence to the US Central America peace movement of the 1980s, people 
and organizations of faith have contributed indispensible resources to the mobilization of 
disruptive political activism.”103  However, SMT alone does not capture the specific 
ideological, faith based, or ethnic and tribal, or economic and structural factors 
motivating action from within such collective groups.  On the other hand, drivers of 
extremism identify the negative factors that advance the development of violent 
extremism, and positive factors that hinder the advancement of violent extremism.104  
Therefore, with SMT, one will identify and examine whether the existing structural and 
political factors in Nigeria present political opportunity, mobilizing structures, and 
framing processes for a collective, Islamic-driven social movement.  Furthermore, the 
addition of the drivers of violent extremism enables one to identify and assess the 
structural, motivational, and triggering factors to measure the vulnerability of Nigeria to 
Islamic extremist ideology, recruitment, and the passive acceptance of religious extremist 
organizations, and distinguish and isolate the specific causes inducing extremist action. 
By combining the conditions and goals of SMT with the motivations of the 
drivers of violent extremism, it is possible to construct a dual-theory lens that not only 
identifies and examines  whether the existing structural and political factors in Nigeria 
present political opportunity, mobilizing structures, and framing processes for a collective 
social movement, but also measure the structural, motivational, and trigger factors that 
may indicate Nigeria’s vulnerability to Islamic extremist ideology, recruitment, and the 
active or passive acceptance of religious extremist organizations. 
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Figure 2.   Combining Social Movement Theory and Drivers of Violent Extremism 
The following chapter will use this combined framework of SMT and drivers of 
violent extremism to look longitudinally at Nigeria’s turbulent political and social history 
since independence.  It will pay particular attention to the current rise of islamically 
motivated violence in the country to see whether Nigeria is vulnerable to the spread of 
Islamic ideology, including Al Qaeda’s message.    
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Violence in Nigeria has always been linked to military coups, state repression or 
intra ethnic and religious clashes. The history of post-colonial Nigeria shows a period of 
tension along ethnic, regional and religious lines.  As the battle for political control 
between different ethnic groups and political parties continues, religion tends to become a 
major factor for mobilizations. Throughout the post-colonial era, tensions have almost 
always led to extreme violence.  
In this chapter, we will use three main variables to analyze how social tensions 
led to extreme violence and how religion is used in Nigerian politics.  From Social 
Movement Theory and the Drivers of Religious Extremism theories, we will examine the 
grievances associated with minority groups, the mobilizations at hand, and the triggers of 
extreme violence. This analysis will cover the first part of the post-colonial era, the First 
and Second Republics, then in the second part, the Third and Fourth Republics. As we 
analyze these social tensions, this chapter will also help determine the growing trend 
towards religious violence. 
A. TENSIONS IN THE FIRST AND SECOND REPUBLICS 
In the First and Second Republics, both religious and ethnic tensions were 
present.  Religion in itself was critical due to the fact that the unified Muslim North 
opposed the diversified Christian South. Drawing from our analytical framework, we will 
analyze the grievances, motivations, and triggers that led to violence. 
1. First Republic 
a. Grievances 
During the First Republic, grievances arose over the fear of ethnic and 
tribal domination. The newly independent country was faced with the challenge of 
administering in a multi-ethnic environment and was characterized by intense 
competition between the three regions. The question, then, was to determine which tribal 
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or ethnic group would control the new federal government. Controlling the government 
also meant controlling economic resources through the federation.   
Political conflicts were often formulated in religious and ethnic terms. The 
ethnic minority fought to maintain their independence from the Muslim Hausa–Fulani 
hegemony.105 During the period that followed independence, Nigeria was split into three 
geopolitical regions: the Western Region dominated by the Yoruba (21 percent of the 
population), the Northern Region, dominated by the Hausa/Fulani (29 percent of the 
population) and the Eastern Region, dominated by the Igbo (18 percent of the 
population).106  The division of the political parties was mainly along regional lines. The 
Northern Peoples Congress (NPC) in the North, the National convention of Nigeria 
Citizens (NCNC) in the East and the Action Group (AG) in the West.107  Because no 
party was able to win the majority in any election, two opposing alliances were formed: 
the Nigerian National Alliance made up of the NPC and the NNDC (i.e., a northern 
party), and the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA) composed of the NCNC, the 
AG, and their allies (constituting a "southern" alignment).108 The NPC, which was led by 
Sardauna Ahmadu Bello, ruled the northern region and was the dominant force in the 
coalition running the Nigerian federation.109 Northerners wished to enhance their 
influence relative to the more developed South while preserving their religious and 
cultural identity.  
Another grievance arose over the 1962 census. The Eastern political 
coalition was hoping that the regional power balance could shift if the 1962 census 
favored the south.110 During the First Republic, population determined the allocation of 
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parliamentary seats, on which the power of every region was based. Population figures 
were also used in allocating revenue to regions. The federal government control by 
northerners was accused of inflating figures, electoral violence, falsification of results, 
and manipulation of population figures in order to maintain their dominance.111 The 
situation augmented the existing grievances. Igbo then started to express their grievances 
over what they perceived as the “Northern Dominance,” inherent confrontation due to the 
religious rivalry between the Muslim dominated north, which was opposed to the 
religiously diverse south.  Local conflicts often translated into religious loyalties and 
were interpreted in terms of the historical antagonism between the ethnic minority 
Christians and the Muslim Hausa-Fulani. 
Additionally, more grievances arose once the constitution gave the federal 
government exclusive control over a wide range of sectors, such as external affairs, the 
defense, currency, communication, and transportation. Limited power was left to the 
three regions, including some socioeconomic programs, education, and agriculture.  
Federalism in the First Republic saw the increasing growth of political and economic 
power in the hands of the central government dominated by northerners.112 Contrary to 
the pre-independence era, where major economic and political decisions were in the 
power of regional governments, the national government progressively sought to control 
critical national sectors, particularly in defense, foreign policy making, and the 
coordination and supervision of economic development.113   
The federal constitution enabled central authorities to assume extensive 
and intrusive powers, including the appropriation of the executive and legislative 
functions of the regional governments.114 The growing fiscal and political supremacy of 
the central government strongly impacted the political system in place. The 
disproportionate size of the north enabled the political party in control of that region, the 
Northern People’s Congress, to project its regional dominance onto the federal arena. The 
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federal party system in the First Republic turned out to be one marked by Northern and 
Muslim dominance.  The situation led to grievances from the other ethnic groups, 
especially the Igbo, because federal development spending was heavily manipulated in 
favor of the North.115 
Another grievance was that the growing subordination of the regions to 
the central government was reinforced by regional tax revenues, especially personal 
income taxes, and the downturn in international prices for regionally controlled primary 
commodities after the late 1950s.  The East (Igbo), whose revenue position was enhanced 
by its share of royalties from the growing exploitation of oil located in its territory, 
experienced a heavy decline in revenue.  Furthermore, since the resulting mass killings 
and exodus of the Igbo following the 1966 coup, the Igbo felt marginalized and 
discriminated against.  These grievances led to the civil war from 1967–1970.116 The 
three regions now faced with budgetary constraints had to turn back to the federal 
government for financial aid or loans. This tough policy was in an effort to make the 
regions understand their financial and economic dependence on the national government.  
Additionally, the growing influence of minorities due to the increasing 
profits of minority controlled territories of highly valuable oil reserves and increasing 
representation in the military since the second military coup, increased grievances and 
heightened ethnic tensions.  The Tiv, were overrepresented as infantryman in the army, 
and the Ibibio, Efik, Ijaw, and Kalabaris retained some of Nigeria’s most valuable oil 
reserves.  This predicament enhanced both the “rule of ethnic minorities” minority 
political potential, strength, and strategy.117     
b. Mobilization 
The Nigerian elites from each region used ethnicity and religion to 
mobilize people at the grassroots level. Most of the elites who took over from the British 
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after independence did not make serious efforts to use resources and value for national 
unity. The northerners constituted a more homogeneous group with their unified Muslim 
religion. They were less educated than the southerners because during the colonial period, 
the North was almost isolated due to their traditional emirate rule. They lost the 
opportunity to develop at the speed of the South, which was ahead in all aspects of 
modernization, education, urbanization commerce, and industrialization.118  
As a result, Northerners consolidated around religion, with a numerical 
advantage, knowing that this advantage would allow them to control the ruling coalition. 
Also, the NPC aimed to both unify the peoples of the region as a single bloc that would 
maintain influence on national affairs and restore the northern religious heritage and 
cultural identity.  To achieve this, the party introduced several training programs to equip 
northern civil servants with qualifications to assume greater control of their government 
at the regional and the federal level.119   
The Igbo from the West mobilized, essentially, around their ethnicity and 
territory and political parties. The Eastern Region was dominated by the NCNC, the 
political party of that region. The party was composed mostly of Igbo. After the failed 
census of 1962 and the election of 1965, they started with mass political rebellion. The 
federal government used the army to crush the opposition.120   
Mobilization also occurred around territory. Lieutenant Colonel 
Odumegwu Ojuku, the military governor of the Eastern Region, managed to consolidate 
the Igbo in their heartland and around the regional capital, Enugu. With time, Ojuku 
became increasingly defiant, seizing federal properties in the east and generally behaving 
as sovereign.121 Many groups both at the national and the international level attempted to 
prevent an escalation of the crisis. On May 26, 1967, Ojuku declared Eastern Nigeria a 
free, sovereign and independent state with the name and title of the Republic of Biafra.122 
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c. Triggers of Violence 
The spirit of regionalism among the ruling class in the First Republic was 
a trigger to the violence that followed. The British and the Rulers of the First Republic 
had failed to unify the country and create a sense of national unity. These circumstances 
triggered the military coup of January 1966, which saw the fall of the First republic. Also, 
in the 1965 census, controversies and desputes arose. The ruling coalition led by 
Northerners was accused of the manipulation of census results in favor of the North. The 
Northern domination pushed a courageous group of officers, mainly from the West (Igbo) 
and led by General Thomas Aguiyi Ironsi, to overturn the civilian government in a brutal 
military coup.123 
During the violent military coup of January 1966, many officials from the 
Western and Northern regions, as well as the federal government, were assassinated. This 
small group of officers also eliminated a number of senior officers who would be likely 
to obstruct their plan.124 With a few exceptions, all those assassinated were Western or 
Northern. Most of the officers involved in the coup were from either the East or the Mid-
West regions, and the majority of them were Igbo and Christian.125 Even though these 
officers claimed that their objectives were national and ideological rather than regional 
and factional, the coup was seen as an Igbo coup against other ethnic groups. The coup 
had been planned with the best intentions but its outcome looked to other ethnic groups, 
particularly the North and the West, like an Igbo conspiracy.126 Out of the seven military 
leaders in the coup, six were Igbo. More importantly, almost all the victims were non-
Igbo. Furthermore, Ironsi lost a lot of popular support when his fellow Igbo jeered at and 
taunted the people of the Northern Region for their losses.  Ironsi also surrounded himself 
with Igbo advisers who irresponsibly urged him to various ill-considered decisions.127 
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For example, he decided to promote twenty-one officers to the rank of lieutenant colonel 
(eighteen of whom were Igbo). Ironsi also took the unwise political decision to abolish 
federalism as a system of government in Nigeria.128 This only showed that the new 
political and military leaders had the same vices as the first republic and that other ethnic 
groups’ grievances increased. 
Following the 1965 military coup, a series of uncontrolled violence and 
reprisals continued. The north/south division became very apparent at this time.129  The 
effect of all these measures was heightened fears (especially in the North) of a plot by the 
Igbo to dominate the country. Protests against these measures, which started peacefully, 
degenerated into riots soon after the announcement of a unitary system of government. 
These led to the attacks on Igbo, first in Zaria and later in other towns in the North. The 
name Igbo has become almost synonymous with exploitation and humiliation.130 This 
quest for survival gave Ojuku and the Igbo the motivation to fight back and resist the 
federal authority controlled by Northerners. They attempted to break away and create the 
Republic of Biafra in May 1967.131 This solution was unacceptable to the rest of Nigeria. 
For Ojuku, creating a separate nation gave the Igbo an opportunity to be free and feel 
secure. 
The Igbo decision to secede also triggered more violence.  This course of 
events started with a civilian uprising in the North and the assassination of General Ironsi 
in May 1966; many other Easterner officers and civilian were also killed by the end of 
July 1966. After the May attacks, some Igbo from the North started to leave the region 
and return to the East, but the majority remained behind. It was the killings that 
accompanied the 29 July 1966 counter-coup that began the massive migration of Igbo 
and non-Igbo back to the East.132 The move to counter the Igbo domination went too far 
and degenerated into mass killings of Igbo in September 1966. The counter-coup brought 
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General Yakubu Gowon, a northern Muslim to power.133 This is why the Igbo’s solution 
to the crisis was to secede from the Nigeria federation and live a separate existence.  
After the Igbo announced the creation of the Republic of Biafra, General 
Yakubu Gowon, the new military ruler of Nigeria declared a state of emergency 
throughout Nigeria and assumed full powers as commander-in-chief of the armed forces 
and head of the federal military government for the period of emergency.134 Furthermore, 
he announced the reorganization of Nigeria into twelve states, three of which were carved 
out of the Eastern region. General Gowon recognized the need to divide Nigeria into 
smaller units in order to prevent any one state from becoming so strong that it would 
either control the central government or opt to secede.135 The result that followed was 
three years of extreme violence in a civil war that left millions of people dead and only 
exacerbated enmity between the different ethnic groups (mainly the Hausa against the 
Igbo). The war ended in January 1970 with a victory for the federal government.136  
Despite Gowan’s success in forming new states and articulating feasible solutions to 
minority grievances, “the ethnic minorities and their political accommodation continued 
to be a striking political issue” that continued to exist without resolution.  The Gowon 
government still failed to develop and construct an effective, modern political system to 
end the rise of ethnic and tribal conflict.  This led to even further regional division into 
political party systems linked to particular territorial areas and cultural groups.137  
The division of Nigeria into three major regions, each dominated by one 
ethnic group and each controlled by a party based on that ethnic group, created a 
vulnerable situation in Nigeria because the regionalized party system created a “future of 
opposition to be in opposition,” which led to further tensions and extreme violence.138 
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2. Second Republic 
In order to avoid the mistakes of the First Republic’s constitution, which allowed 
for the creation of political parties along ethnic lines, the Second Republic made 
provisions to reflect the ethnic and cultural diversity of Nigeria. The 1979 constitution 
encouraged political parties to become national, rather than regional, in order to reflect 
the federal character principle, and Nigeria entered the Second Republic with institutions 
that diverged remarkably from those of the First Republic. The Second Republic was 
preceded by a decade of military ruling. The military rulers of that period created a 
Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC).139 Together, they came out with provisions that 
prescribed a substantial expansion in the legislative mandate of the federal government.   
The new constitution was essentially an American-style presidential system 
abolishing the Westminster parliamentary system, and recognizing the federal character 
and the cultural diversity of Nigeria. Under these provisions, special procedures were set 
for electing the president, the formation of political parties, and the composition and 
conduct of public agencies.140 Also, the military, a stronger institution, was able to 
maintain a form of national unity. Nonetheless, other problems, such as the worsening of 
the economy, the intensity of authoritarian regime, increasingly popular resistance and 
political and religious activism became prevalent.141 An isolated religiously based 
incident that threatened the existence of the Federal Republic of Nigeria occurred in 
northern state of Kano: The Maitatsine Crisis.  
a. Grievances 
Parts of the grievances in the Second Republic were the continued 
northern dominance and government corruption. With a military regime, it was difficult 
for minority groups to express their grievances. Harsh repression was often the response 
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given by the military authorities.  This repression created many grievances because of the 
high number of victims in police or military violence.   
The Maitatsine crisis represented an unprecedented number of grievances 
in the Second Republic. The member of the Maitatsine sect felt that with corrupt 
authorities and Muslim clerics, Islam was the appropriate solution to fix the declining 
Nigerian society.  The leader of the sect, Muhammed Marwa, was an Islamic 
fundamentalist scholar who migrated from Cameroon to the city of Kano in 1945.142 For 
the members of this sect, Islam in particular and the Nigerian society as a whole was 
corrupt and needed to be purified by all means necessary. The authorities were able to 
predict and repress political activism but a new form of activism arose, in a religious 
form, characterized by the Maitatsine crisis.   
b. Mobilization 
Maitatsine mobilized a large crowd of followers, especially among the 
Tallakawa (commoners).143  They mobilized around the motto that Islam had to be 
purified by all means necessary. The activities of Maitatsine and his followers became a 
threat to the people of Kano. Part of their mobilization was conducting unauthorized open 
air gatherings, which caused the police to intervene. On December 18, 1980, the police 
underrated the strength of the sect, and the two police units that went to the operation 
were soon overpowered by the members of the sect. Members of the sect used bows, 
arrows, knives, and guns to oppose the police. They burned all  thirteen police vehicles, 
killed four policemen, and injured the rest whom they stripped off their weapons. 
Encouraged by the defeat of the police, the sect marched in Kano, chanting provocative 
songs in Hausa. By December 19, the sect took over strategic places in Kano city, 
including the Fagge mosque, some schools, a cinema house, and the market place. For 
eleven days, the police were unable to control the sectarian riots.  
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c. Triggers 
The Maitatsine crisis became a trigger for extreme violence in the form of 
a government crackdown. Their constant preaching became very abusive and 
provocative, especially against established institutions like the Emirate and the political 
class, to the point where the Emir of Kano expelled him from Kano. He came back to 
Kano in 1966 and continued his violent preaching, which caused him to be detained in 
prison several times. Because of his abusive preaching, he earned the name Maitatsine 
which means “one who curses.”144 
As the sect’s preaching was getting out of control, President Shehu 
Shagari had to invite the Nigerian army to intervene. It took the army two days to 
dislodge the sect. The leader of the sect was killed during the operation and thousands of 
his followers were arrested and tortured in prison. The death of the sect leader was the 
tipping point that triggered a series of uncontrolled violence, both from the members of 
the sect and the federal authorities. The crisis lasted eleven days, claimed the lives of 
4,179 people, and hundreds of houses were torched or destroyed.145 The Maitasine case 
denotes a new form of religious activism that inspired many more uprising in the future 
and the politicization of religion. After this crisis, religion became a major tool that 
politicians used, not only to get popular support, but also to enhance their political power. 
B. RELIGIOUS TENSIONS IN THE THIRD AND FOURTH REPUBLICS 
Like the first two Republics, the Third and Fourth Republics also witnessed 
continued tensions with a growing trend towards religiously motivated violence. The 
main difference between the previous republics and these latter republics is the violent 
radicalization of religion, which started in the beginning of the 1980s. The ideologies and 
rhetoric used by politicians had changed.  Both Christians and Muslim elites started to  
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express publicly the need for religious representation in politics and public offices. 
Religion was no longer used for ideological objectives like in the Maitatsine crisis, but 
rather for political objectives. 
1. Third Republic 
The Third Republic only lasted a few years, from 1989 to 1993. After the 1967–
1970 civil war, some political and religious leaders made great efforts to appease the 
tensions, redefining the constitution and mandating political parties to be reflective of the 
entire society. With the new provisions of the Second Republic’s Constitution, conditions 
were set for a more integrated political system and regional representation in the central 
government.  
a. Grievances 
The grievances during the Third Republic were due to the continued 
period of military ruling and the repression associated with it, and the continued fear of 
Muslim Hausa domination. Since the fall of the First Republic in 1966, every attempt to 
return to civilian rule failed. Military coups were often very violent leaving many people 
dead. Also, northerners, who were in the majority in the Army, were able to maintain 
their dominance and ruled most of the post-independence era. Southerners were better 
educated and better equipped for government work. State repression was also very 
prevalent and this situation fueled more grievances.  
A key political event occurred that increased the existing grievances in 
Nigeria. In January 1986, under the leadership of Military Ruler General Babanguida, a 
northern Muslim, Nigeria secretly joined the Organization of Islamic Conferences 
(OIC).146 The OIC guidelines require that a member country be predominantly Muslim, 
with a Muslim head of state. When the news of Babanguida’s political move became 
known throughout Nigeria, the reactions were strong from all sides and tensions between 
Christians and Muslims increased. The grievance expressed by Christians was the fear of 
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the Islamization of Nigeria. The situation created heated debates within Nigeria and 
opinions varied depending on whether there was a Muslim or a Christian Head of State. 
As a result, Nigeria decided to keep a low profile in the OIC, allowing only diplomats to 
attend meetings and not the heads of state. 
b. Mobilization 
As in the past, the main tools of mobilization were political parties and 
ethno-religious associations. Before the foundation of the main political parties in 
Nigeria, a large number of local ethnic associations were formed in Northern Nigeria. 
These associations were locally confined and often led by school teachers. Ethnic 
associations were the forerunners of the main political parties.147 The two dominating 
parties in the central Islamic part of Northern Nigeria were the National People’s 
Congress (NPC) and the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU).  Political leaders 
from these parties and associations started to become vocal on the role of religion in 
Nigerian politics. As an example, MKO Abiola, a Muslim Yoruba chief, explicitly called 
for a reinterpretation of federal character in religious terms, contending that public 
policies and institutions had not given due regard to the interest of the “largest body of 
Nigerians, who are Muslims.”  A similar case for the explicit recognition of religion as an 
element of Nigeria’s federal character was made by Ambassador Jolly Tanko Yussuf of 
the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN). Yussuf argued that if a Muslim were 
appointed Minister of External Affairs, a Christian should be made Minister of Petroleum 
Resources, and that if the President were a Muslim, a Christian should be Minister of 
Defense.148  
c. Triggers 
Violence in the Third Republic was triggered by the continuation of 
Northern dominance and politicization of religion. The OIC crisis and subsequent 
development under the Third Republic appeared to have confirmed Christian fears about 
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a growing Muslim stronghold on key national political appointments. Peaceful 
demonstrations were initiated but became more violent over time. Religious activism and 
an increasing number of religious-based violence occurred, especially in the northern 
states.149 Christian complaints reached a climax in January 1990, when Christian groups 
staged large street demonstrations in some of the country’s major cities to denounce the 
new federal cabinet appointments of President Babanguida that appeared to heavily favor 
Muslims.150  
2. Fourth Republic 
The Fourth Republic of Nigeria was inaugurated on May 29, 1999, with the 
adoption of a new constitution and the installation of a new civilian administration under 
the leadership of Olusegun Obasanjo.151 This period has been marked by a tremendous 
amount of religious violence.  
a. Grievances 
The grievances over Nigeria joining the OIC continued in the Fourth 
Republic. In 1999, with the restoration of civilian rule and the birth of the fourth republic, 
Nigeria witnessed, for the first time in history, an elected Christian southerner, Olusegun 
Obasanjo. This was an opportunity for Christians to reverse Muslim dominance. Like the 
Christians before, Muslims also started to complain. In April 2000, a communiqué from 
the Council of Ulama of Nigeria denounced the “imbalance” allegedly perpetuated by the 
new administration’s “systematic relegation of Muslims within the ranks of the armed 
forces and federal establishment.”152 Tensions continued to increase in the political 
arena. Ibrahim Datti Ahmed, a noted politician and Muslim scholar, accused the 
Obasanjo administration of openly pursuing a “Christian agenda” by “removing 
northerners and Muslims from positions and replacing them with Christians.”   
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b. Mobilization 
In the Fourth Republic, mobilization was also done around political parties 
and ethnic and religious associations, such as the Council of Ulama and the Christian 
Association of Nigeria (CAN).153 In the years 2000 and after, allegations and counter-
allegations of ethno/religious domination continued causing even more friction in some 
of the states than at the federal level. For instance, Christian groups in the northern states, 
such as the northern branch of CAN and the Northern Christian Forum, denounced what 
they called “Muslim domination” in their states. Specifically, they condemned the 
permanent leadership of northern traditional rulers in the Sultan of Sokoto, the continuing 
imposition of Emirate Sharia on the non-Muslim population of the Middle Belt Region, 
the marginalization of Christian police officers in the appointment of police 
commissioners in the northern states, and the suppression of Christian broadcasts as well 
as Christian religious curricula and other educational privileges in state-owned electronic 
media and schools in the north.154 
c. Triggers 
Violence in the Fourth Republic was essentially triggered by the planned 
application of Sharia law in Northern States. In January 2000, the governor of Zamfara 
State implemented legislation authorizing Sharia in the criminal domain applicable to all 
Muslims in the state.  This enactment was based on two interpretations of the 1999 
constitution.155 First, the precedent of dual legal systems based on Muslim affiliation was 
established in the domain of civil law, to include family law, as per the 1979 and the 
1998 constitutions.156 Second, legislation that was not specifically prohibited in the 1999 
constitution and that was a matter of state concern was appropriate for state-level action, 
provided that it did not contravene fundamental constitutional rights. Subsequently, 
eleven other far northern states also passed some form of Sharia criminal law, applicable  
to Muslims only. However, certain aspects of the Sharia, such as the banning of alcohol 
and prostitution, were applicable to all citizens in those states that held a stricter 
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interpretation of the law. During the long year of military rule, the issue of Sharia was  
largely dormant. With the return to civilian elections, in the fall of 1998, Ahmed Sani, the 
APP candidate for governor of Zamfara State, ran on a platform of establishing Sharia in 
all domains.157 On his inauguration, Zamfara became the first state to institute Sharia in 
the criminal domain. He opted for the hard-line interpretation of the law and its 
punishment, while states like Kaduna applied a looser interpretation, and only in the 
predominantly Muslim local government authorities. 
The full introduction of Sharia was defended by northern Muslim elite, 
including ex-heads of states, Alhaji Shehu Shagari and General Muhammadu Buhari, on 
several grounds:  the overwhelming Muslim composition and culture of the north; the 
popularity of Sharia especially among youths and the intelligentsia for whom the Islamic 
code represented a potential weapon for the reorientation of a morally decadent and 
materially dislocated northern society; the recognition, under the 1999 Fourth Republic 
constitution, of collective religious rights;  the rights of the states to establish and define 
the jurisdiction of the Sharia court of appeal;  the fact that the constitutionally prescribed 
legislative procedure was carefully observed in Zamfara, Sokoto, Kano, and other states 
where the Sharia system had been established; and the recognition, under the Sharia 
regime, of the fundamental rights of non-Muslims, who  would be largely exempted from 
the purview of Islamic law.158 
Non-Muslims denounced the imposition of strict Sharia as a violation of 
the constitutional prohibition of state religion. They also contended that the extension of 
Sharia would effectively relegate them to the status of second-class citizens.159 The most 
violent opposition to the introduction of Sharia law took place in Kaduna State, where 
hundreds of lives were lost in horrific riots, over the issue, between February and May 
2000. The riots occurred precisely because the proposed extension of Sharia in the state 
inflamed the long-standing antipathy between the predominantly Christian southern 
Kaduna minority tribes and the Muslim Hausa-Fulani, who are in total control of 
government machinery and resources in that state. The Sharia crisis of 1999–2000 also 
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resonated in the religiously bi-communal Yoruba states. Numerous waves of religious 
polarization and agitation developed in the immediate aftermath of the OIC debacle in the 
Western Yoruba states, which had been famous for the exceptionally peaceful 
coexistence between their Muslim and Christian communities in the past. The federal 
character of the Fourth Republic was intended to promote national integration but its 
politics have proved to be extremely divisive in regional, ethnic and religious terms. 
Violence was often carried out by gangs or cults of unemployed youth who were often 
paid by politicians or party leaders and was manifested in attacks on political enemies, 
rigged elections, the destruction of private property, as well as the vandalization of sacred 
places of worship. 
Finally, the enlistment of Nigeria in the Organization of Islamic 
Conferences in 1986 and the development and introduction of Islamic law into the 
political arena, especially with the introduction of Sharia, seems to suggest that Nigeria 
has drastically changed from a religiously peaceful to a religiously polarized federation. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The history of the post-independence era in Nigeria has been marked by 
continuous ethnic and religious tensions that have often degenerated into religiously 
motivated violence. Since the first military coup of 1966 and the Biafra civil war of 
1967–1970, Nigeria has been in a state of neither peace nor war, characterized by low 
intensity conflicts.160 The origins of these tensions stem from the administrative division 
of the country into three regions, each dominated by a major ethnic group, immediately 
after independence: the Western Region dominated by the Yoruba (21 percent of the 
population), the Northern Region, dominated by the Hausa/Fulani (29 percent of the 
population) and the Eastern Region dominated by the Igbo (18 percent of the 
population).161  Additionally, the political ruling class was divided along regional lines:  
the Northern Peoples Congress (NPC) in the North, the National convention of Nigeria 
Citizens (NCNC) in the East, and the Action Group (AG) in the West.162   
These divisions created low intensity conflict on religious, ethical, and political 
levels because neither the political parties nor the ethnic tribes were able to win the 
majority in any election.  Therefore, two opposing alliances were formed: the Nigerian 
National Alliance made up of the NPC and the Northern Nigeria Development Company 
(NNDC), and the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA) composed of the NCNC, 
the AG, and their allies (constituting a "Southern" alignment).163  The North wished to 
enhance their influence relative to the more developed South while preserving their 
religious and cultural identity. The NPC aimed to both unify the peoples of the region as 
a single bloc that would maintain influence on national affairs and restore the Northern 
religious heritage and cultural identity.164  Northern civil servants then equipped 
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themselves with qualifications to assume greater control of their government at the 
regional and federal levels.  Additionally, the Igbo expressed their fears and grievances of 
what they foresaw as “Northern Dominance.” 165   This led to years of violence linked to 
coups, state repression, and intra-ethnic and religious clashes to induce a change in 
Nigerian society.166 
Besides these ethnic and political divisions, tribes play an important role in 
Nigeria’s tensions. The most influential tribe of Nigeria’s north, the Hausa/Fulani tribe, 
dominated the ruling coalition and Nigeria’s federal system for years.  However, the 
Igbo, in the West, were also influential due to their rich natural resources.167  The first 
constitution, in 1962, allowed a strong central government, with centralized power, to be 
responsible for the allocation of resources.168  This deprived the Igbo of controlling 
natural resources in their land, yielding more influence and control to the Hausa in the 
North.  As the Igbo were unable to reverse the trend of Northern domination, they 
initiated a military coup marking the end of the First Republic.169 Each constitutional 
change in the four republics attempted to redefine the rules of the game in a way that no 
region or ethnic group would have total control over the political arena or attempt to 
secede.   
In the First and Second Republics, Nigeria experienced ethnic and religious 
conflicts; however, in the Third and Fourth Republics the ethnic and religious disputes 
and struggles transitioned to religiously motivated violence in an attempt to resolve 
increasing grievances induced by the Nigerian Christians’ fear of the Islamisation of 
Nigeria.  
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A. SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY, DRIVERS OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM 
AND NIGERIAN VIOLENCE 
Dissecting the socio-political context of each republic of Nigeria using Social 
Movement Theory and the Drivers of Violent extremism yielded several important 
findings. First, the outbreak of ethnic and religious violence in Nigeria suggests that 
minority groups facing oppression tend to react as long as there is a political opportunity 
at hand and the group has the motivation to act.  As an example, the Igbo, who were the 
dominant tribe in the East with rich natural resources, felt deprived of their riches by a 
central government dominated by the Hausa/Fulani from the North. In order to stop the 
oppression, they launched a coup d’état, which was violently repressed. Later on, as the 
oppression continued, they tried to secede from the rest of the federation by creating the 
Republic of Biafra.  The Maitatsine crisis is another example of a minority religious 
group who wanted to bring change to society because they felt that their religion was 
corrupted by secular governments and corrupt religious leaders manipulated by Western 
influences outside the Arab world.170   The sect’s demonstrations were also violently 
repressed but their activities gave rise to a new type of activism, using religion for 
political ends. 
Second, Nigeria shows how religion can be used for political purposes.  In 
Nigeria, Islam, in particular, has been used in this way. For example, in 1986, President 
Babanguida secretly joined the OIC.171 This political move was seen as attempt to make 
Nigeria an Islamic state. In 2000, many Muslim political figures explicitly called for a 
reinterpretation of the federal character of Nigeria in religious terms.172 They argued that 
public policies and institutions should give due regard to the interests of Muslims, as they 
are the largest religious community, with 21 percent of the overall population.   
Third, religious tensions are exacerbated when there is a major political event 
such as elections. After the April 2011 presidential elections, which saw a victory for the 
Christian Southerner Goodluck Johnathan, his main opponent, Shagari, and many other 
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Muslims contested the results. Recent violence also suggests that the fight for political 
control between Muslims and Christians is not yet resolved. 
Finally, the transition from solely ethnic and religious tensions to religiously 
motivated violence was triggered after Nigeria elected to join the Organization of Islamic 
Conferences (OIC) in 1986 and its adoption of Sharia law in 1999.  In January 1986, 
under the leadership of military ruler General Babanguida, Nigeria secretly joined the 
Organization of Islamic Conferences (OIC). The OIC guidelines assert that member 
states be predominantly Muslim and have a Muslim head of state.173  Once Nigeria’s 
secret alliance within the OIC became known throughout Nigeria, the reactions were 
strong on all sides and tensions between Christians and Muslims heightened.  In an 
attempt to resolve the OIC controversy, a federal decree established the National Council 
for Religious Affairs in 1987.174  The OIC crisis reinforced religious grievances and fears 
among Christians, led to even greater religious tensions between Christians and Muslims, 
and made the possibility of a Muslim-dominated Nigeria more feasible.  Then, to bolster 
Islamic influence, in 1999–2000, Sharia law was codified within the state constitutional 
law of twelve of Nigeria’s thirty-six states.175  
Christians believe that the Muslim political leaders who initiated these political 
moves were trying to make Nigeria an Islamic state where Sharia law would be applied 
even to non-Muslims. Relationships between the two communities, which had been 
amicable in the past, became extremely tense. The North/South dichotomy, which had 
seen struggles between Hausa Northerners and Nigeria’s Southerners (Igbo and Yoruba), 
had now shifted from ethnic to religiously motivated. This is due, in part, to 
constitutional changes in the Second and Third Republics that addressed ethnic 
domination. As a result, power and resources were shared and ethnic tensions diminished. 
The political move of the OIC and adopting Sharia became the tipping points that 
allowed the North/South battle to shift from ethnic to religious. 
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As political leaders have reduced ethnic violence by making constitutional 
provisions that allow equal distribution of power and resources, there is also a need for 
provisions that engage religious issues. These provisions should address, for example, the 
separation of religion from government and, thereby, make Nigeria a neutral state as 
opposed to an Islamic state. The government should also allow equal distribution of 
power among various religious communities.  Finally, the government should prohibit the 
use of religion by politicians. If these laws are not in place, one can expect that religious 
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